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A B S T R A C T
In a novel experimental design, we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each
agent’s wealth at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t+1. In this setting, growth and inequality
arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on coop-
eration. We ﬁnd that amounts contributed are increasing over time even in the absence of punishment
possibilities. Variation in wealth is substantial with the richest groups earningmore than ten times what the
poorest groups earn. Introducing the possibility of punishment does not increase wealth and in some cases
even decreases it. In the presence of a punishment option, inequality in early periods is strongly negatively
correlatedwith group income in later periods, highlighting negative interaction effects between endogenous
inequality and punishment.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Social dilemmas, where collective and private interests are in
conﬂict, abound in economic and social life. Public good games
have been used across disciplines as the standard tool to study a
wide array of social dilemma situations. These include joint ven-
tures (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986), R&D cooperation (Cozzi, 1999;
Kamien et al., 1992), political action funds of special interest groups
or parties (Dawes et al., 1986), multilateral foreign aid and effort
provision in work teams (Ostrom, 1990; Hamilton et al., 2003;
Tirole, 1986). But also pricing or market sharing agreements by ﬁrms
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(Green and Porter, 1984) as well as many economic activities in the
family (Becker, 1981) can be thought of as instances of cooperation
that can be modeled with public good games. One feature that is
common to many of these examples is that there are dynamic inter-
dependencies: not only will the same set of people interact again, but
previous outcomes affect future endowments (both in terms of the
stock of physical and social capital).
In this paper, we present a novel experimental design that cap-
tures such dynamic interdependencies. Our design builds on what
has become the workhorse model to study public good provision
in experiments (see e.g. Isaac et al. (1984), Andreoni (1995) or Fis-
chbacher and Gächter (2010) among many others): participants are
matched in ﬁxed groups of four people to play the public good
game for 10 or 15 periods. As in most other public good experi-
ments, we focus on the most challenging social dilemma situations,
where the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prescribes zero
contributions by all group members, but where eﬃciency requires
group members to contribute their entire endowment. We also con-
duct experiments where each groupmember can punish other group
members by reducing their ﬁrst stage earnings at a cost to them-
selves (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Andreoni et al.,
2003).
The key difference to previous research using this “standard”
design is that each participant’s wealth at the end of a period
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.03.002
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constitutes their endowment for the next period, whereas in the
“standard design” endowments are allocated exogenously and tend
to be the same in each round.1 In our design, endowments are
created endogenously, which leads to dynamic interdependencies.
We focus on two important implications of introducing these
interdependencies. First, if overall contributions today are high, then
there will be higher wealth in the next period (growth). Second,
heterogeneity in contributions today creates inequality in endow-
ments in the following period. Growth and inequality can interact
with the possibility of punishment in different ways. The threat of
punishment can lead to higher growth if it induces higher contri-
butions, but punishment executed on the outcome path can induce
a multiplier effect which can hamper growth severely. Maybe more
interestingly, punishment can interact with inequality in non-trivial
ways. In particular, rich group members can be largely “immune” to
punishment by poorer group members, if the punishment that poor
group members can afford is too small relative to the richest group
member’s wealth. As all endowment can be used for punishment,
rich group members, on the other hand, might be able to punish
others harshly at a relatively low cost to themselves. This asym-
metry of punishment possibilities translates wealth inequality into
inequality in power to punish. In addition, in unequal groups richer
group members will typically be free-riders implying that punish-
ment power could be in the “wrong hands”. This raises the question
of whether punishment will be as effective in increasing contribu-
tions and group income as it has been in settings without these
dynamic interdependencies.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Even in the
absence of punishment contribution and wealth levels display a
strictly increasing trend over time. In terms of the realized potential
for growth and the level of inequality, there is a lot of variation across
groups. Individual earnings range between 2 Euros and 241 Euros.
The Gini coeﬃcient assumes the full range between 0 (equal wealth
of all group members) and 1 (one group member appropriates the
entire wealth) in the experiment.
Punishment (or the possibility thereof) does not increase wealth.
This is true in both the 10 and 15-period variations despite the
fact that people tend to contribute more in the treatment with
punishment in the 10-period variations. We ﬁnd evidence for two
mechanisms behind this result: (i) in groups where inequality is
high (above median) there is more anti-social than pro-social pun-
ishment, i.e. shirkers punish contributors more than vice versa and
(ii) much of this punishment happens in early periods implying that
resources are taken away exponentially.2
While the possibility of punishment does not increase wealth and
in some cases even strictly decreases it, it also does not increase
inequality on average. This is true despite the inequality-increasing
presence of anti-social punishment. Analysis of data from Herrmann
et al. (2008) shows that, in a comparable standard setting, punish-
ment increases both wealth and inequality. In terms of the rela-
tionship between inequality and growth, we ﬁnd that inequality in
period 2 is strongly negatively correlated with wealth in period 10
in the treatment with punishment possibilities. In particular, a 1%
increase in inequality in period 2 leads to a ≈0.5% decrease in wealth
1 Throughout the paper, we will use the expression “standard design” to refer to the
many studies of linear voluntary contribution experiments, where the one shot game
is repeated for some number of periods. See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of the earlier
literature and Chaudhury (2011) or Chapter 6 in Plott and Smith (2009) for a survey of
more recent results.
2 History books report many examples where “shirking group members” have
assumed power by exploiting asymmetric punishment opportunities. Standard Oil
reportedly sent out thugs to raid the premises of competitors as a form of punish-
ment (Josephson, 1962). Adler (1985) discusses endogenously arising asymmetries in
punishment possibilities in a study of upper-level drug-dealing and Johnson and Earle
(1987) among North-American Indians.
in period 10. Inequality and growth are positively related across
groups with below median wealth and negatively related across
groups with above median wealth.
In interpreting these results, it is important to note how the
setting we introduce differs from the standard public good game
described above. There are two main differences: (i) there is no con-
sumption until the last round in our setting, i.e. one’s entire wealth
can be reinvested at the end of the period and (ii) endowments are
endogenous, i.e. determined by previous outcomes. R + D coopera-
tion often displays these features, but also the evolution of societies
could be viewed under this lens. In the standard setting, by con-
trast, there is full consumption, i.e. no wealth can be reinvested and
endowments are exogenous (and stationary). Volunteering, e.g. at a
food bank, seems a good example falling into this category. Other
types of volunteering, such as in natural conservation and archiving,
are examples involving stationary exogenous endowments, but no
or little consumption. The case of full consumption with endogenous
endowments describes the one-shot game. Finally, note that many
applications, such as infrastructure investments, multilateral foreign
aid or pricing agreements will fall somewhere in between these
extremes with some, but not full consumption and with partially
endogenous endowments.
1.2. Literature review
To our knowledge, our experiment is the ﬁrst to study public
good provision with dynamic interdependencies and endogenously
arising asymmetric punishment possibilities.3 As such, it contributes
to studies of public goods with dynamic interdependencies more
broadly. These include Battaglini et al. (2016) who study the Markov
perfect equilibrium dynamics in the provision of a durable public
good over time where there is consumption in each period. They
ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant under-provision relative to the interior
equilibrium. Duffy et al. (2007) studied threshold public good games
withmultiple contribution rounds, where, theoretically, “completion
equilibria” (with positive contributions) do exist. They ﬁnd that, as
in the standard setting, contributions do decline over time (see also
Croson andMarks, 1998 among others). Noussair and Soo (2008) and
Cadigan et al. (2011) study dynamic public good settings where the
current return from the public good depends on past contributions.
Other studies link public good games over time via explicit reputa-
tion mechanisms (e.g. Milinski et al., 2002). Rockenbach and Wolff
(2017) have recently studied a setting where games are linked via
endowments. They use a non-linear exchange rate, though, which
effectively eliminates the possibility of exponential growth and con-
tains inequality. Consequently, their results aremore similar to those
obtained in the standard setting.
Our results also contribute to research on the impact of inequal-
ity on public good provision. Most existing literature has studied the
effects of exogenous income inequality. Chan et al. (1996) experi-
mentally test a prediction by Bergstrom et al. (1986), where public
good provision increases with inequality in the income distribu-
tion in an equilibrium with positive contributions. They ﬁnd that
group behaviour conforms with the theoretical prediction. Other
authors have found that exogenous income inequality decreases con-
tributions (van Dijk et al., 2002; Ostrom et al., 1994) or found no
effect (Chan et al., 1999). Reuben and Riedl (2013) ﬁnd that without
punishment there is no effect of income inequality on contribu-
tions, while with punishment participants contribute proportionally
3 In an unpublished Master thesis, Huck (2006) has conducted a dynamic public
good game without the possibility of punishment and related contributions to per-
sonality characteristics elicited in a questionnaire. He also did not analyze growth and
inequality but, like us, he ﬁnds a pattern of increasing contributions (in terms of abso-
lute amounts) and no endgame effect. See also Grosse (2011) who studies versions of
dynamic public good games and ﬁnds that relative contributions decline over time.
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to their endowments, leading to increased contributions. All these
papers deal with one-shot games and exogenously imposed inequal-
ity. Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) study exogenous inequality in the
Bergstrom et al. (1986) setting with the possibility of growth. They
ﬁnd that exogenous variations of inequality are mostly neutral to
growth.4 The latter result contrasts with our ﬁnding that endoge-
nous inequality is negatively related to growth in the presence of
punishment. One possible reason for the difference between these
results is that, as discussed above, with endogenous inequality the
power to punish tends to lie “in the wrong hands” (those of free-
riders).
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the standard set-
ting of repeated public good games surveyed in Chaudhury (2011).
One insight emerging from this literature is that societies can main-
tain high levels of contributions and wealth if there is a threat of
punishment to free-riders (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2003).5 While some
studies have found that punishment can lead to lower payoffs if the
horizon of the game is short (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Dreber et al.,
2008), under a long horizon punishment in the standard setting has
been found to be strictly beneﬁcial (Gächter et al., 2008). Punishment
does not increase wealth in our setting neither under a 10-period
nor a 15-period horizon. We do not study longer horizons, but since
many groups in the treatment with punishment destroy (almost) all
wealth by period 10, these groups will be unable to recover even
with a very long horizon. Some studies of the standard setting inves-
tigate how an increased marginal per capita rate of return affects
contributions (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Goeree et al., 2002). There is
some relation of these studies to our setting, since the possibilities of
exponential growth provides increased incentives to contribute.
Finally, the dynamic setting we study also relates to other
dynamic games studied in economics. In the common pool resource
game (CPR, Ostrom et al., 1994) players extract from a resource in
each period with the non-extracted part growing at a ﬁxed rate.
There are various differences between this setting and our dynamic
public good game (apart from the frame). One is that whatever is
contributed in our public good game is mechanically shared among
all participants. How the beneﬁts of non-extraction are shared
depend on players’ strategies. On the other hand, what is with-
held in our public good game in one period can be contributed in
the next. What is extracted in the CPR game, however, cannot be
reverted to the pool in future periods. As a consequence of these var-
ious differences, both games have different equilibria. The CPR game
has an interior stationary Markov equilibrium where players extract
too much relative to the eﬃcient benchmark (Mailath and Samuel-
son, 2005). By contrast, in our dynamic public good game the only
equilibrium has zero contributions in all rounds (Section 3).
Herr et al. (1997) study two variations of the CPR game, onewhere
extraction by one player increases the cost of extraction by others
in the current period only, and one where extraction increases the
costs for all future periods. While both versions have interior equi-
libria, the latter type of externality should worsen the CPR problem,
i.e. lead to lower eﬃciency. Experimental behaviour is in line with
equilibrium benchmarks. Botelho et al. (2014) study a game that lies
in between a classic CPR and Centipede game, in that they study
a CPR game which ends as soon as the resource stock falls below
a certain level. They show that increasing uncertainty about that
level increases extraction and hence the ineﬃciency. Battaglini et al.
(2016) discussed above can be viewed as a public good study within
the CPR paradigm.
4 In a trust game with limited growth, Greiner et al. (2011), however, ﬁnd that both
exogenous and endogenous variation in income affect growth.
5 Cason and Gangadharan (2015) note, though, that the impact of punishment is
weaker in non-linear social dilemmas.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
experimental design. Section 3 discusses the theoretical predictions
and summarizes our research questions. Section 4 contains our main
results. In Section 5, we discuss the mechanisms underlying these
results. Section 6 concludes. An Online Appendix contains screen-
shots, experimental instructions and the questionnaire, proofs of
the theoretical predictions and several additional results, tables and
ﬁgures.
2. Experimental design
In our experiment, participants play a sequence of dynamically
interdependent public good games in twomain treatments: (1) treat-
ment NOPUNISH in which participants only play the public good
game; (2) treatment PUNISH where, after each period, participants
can also subtract tokens from other members of their group at a cost.
We describe these treatments in turn.
2.1. Treatment NOPUNISH
At the beginning of the experiment participants are randomly
matched into groups of 4, which stay the same throughout the exper-
iment. Participants are indexed i ∈ I = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Before period 1,
each participant is given 20 tokens as initial endowment. In each
period participants can divide their tokens into two accounts: a pri-
vate account and a group account. The private account, which has
a return of 1, is for their personal use only and other participants
cannot inﬂuence or beneﬁt from the tokens in the private account.
The group account is different: all 4 participants in the group can
place their tokens into the group account. The group account has a
return of 1.5 and after the return is calculated, the tokens put into the
group account are equally divided among all 4 participants. There-
fore, if participant i has Nti tokens before period t and she places c
t
i
tokens into the group account, then the rest of the tokens automat-
ically go to the private account and at the end of period t, she will
have Nti − cti + 1.54
∑
j=1..4c
t
j tokens. In the NOPUNISH treatment, this
amount also corresponds to the number of tokens before period t+1
(the endowment at t+1):
Nt+1i = N
t
i − cti +
1.5
4
4∑
j=1
ctj .
Therefore, in period t + 1, the number of tokens that each par-
ticipant can invest depends on the choices of all group members
in previous periods (endogenous endowments). This is what makes
our set-up different from the standard setting where the amount
of tokens before each period is ﬁxed and the earnings from pre-
vious periods cannot be used for investment into the public good
(exogenous stationary endowments). At the end of each period par-
ticipants observe information about endowments and contributions
of all group members (Fig. A.1 in Online Appendix A).
2.2. Treatment PUNISH
The PUNISH treatment is the same as the NOPUNISH treatment
with the difference that, after all participants in the group have
allocated their tokens and observed others’ allocations (as in NOP-
UNISH), they have a possibility to subtract tokens from individual
members of the group. The cost of subtraction is 13 of the tokens
subtracted.
More speciﬁcally, let pti,j denote the cost of punishment that
participant i incurs after punishing participant j by 3pti,j tokens at
period t, and denote by Wti := N
t
i − cti + 1.54
∑4
j=1 c
t
j the amount of
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pre-punishment tokens of player i. The amount of tokens that partic-
ipant i has after punishment and hence at the start of period t+ 1 is
then
Nt+1i = min
J∈J ti
⎧⎨
⎩Wti −
∑
j∈J
3ptj,i
⎫⎬
⎭−
∑
j=i
pti,j
where J ti contains all nonempty subsets J ⊆ I such that (a) i /∈ J, (b) if
k ∈ J then j ∈ J for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}{i}, and (c)Wti −
∑
j∈J3ptj,i ≥ 0. This
formulation accounts for the fact that punishments which would
set a player’s wealth below zero are not executed.6 After the pun-
ishment phase, each participant observes the following information
before the next period starts (see Fig. A.3 in Online Appendix A): the
amount of tokens that each other member of the group subtracted
from her; the total amount of tokens subtracted from each member
of the group; the amount of tokens each group member has at the
end of the period, which serves as the endowment in the next period.
Labels for group members on these screens are randomized across
periods.
2.3. Additional treatments
As we outlined above, the dynamic interdependencies in this
setting create two types of effects: (i) they create the possibility
for endogenous growth and (ii) they create endogenous inequal-
ity and hence asymmetries in the power to punish others. To
better understand the impact of these two forces we ran addi-
tional treatments, where we artiﬁcially eliminate growth (treat-
ments NOPUNISH-NOGROWTH and PUNISH-NOGROWTH) but keep
endogenous inequality or where we artiﬁcially eliminate inequal-
ity but keep growth (treatments NOPUNISH-NOINEQUALITY and
PUNISH-NOINEQUALITY). We will discuss these treatments in more
detail in Section 5.
2.4. Length variations
In addition to the punishment variation, we added a second
treatment variation which changes the number of repetitions of the
public good game. We conducted sessions with 10 periods and ses-
sions with 15 periods to understand how a longer horizon might
affect behaviour and hence get some insights into how partici-
pants might perceive this environment strategically.7 Due to the
(potentially) exponential increase of earnings over time in our set-
ting, we limited the long horizon to 15 periods.8 Participants were
informed about all these details of the design at the beginning of the
experiment.
6 If participants’ punishment plans are infeasible, e.g. because in the aggregate they
would set a player’s wealth below zero, then only players 1 and 2’s plans are executed
if feasible (as labeled in the software). If those are also infeasible then only player 1’s
plan is executed. Since subject labels are randomized by the software this does not
create imbalances between subjects. Note also that all players have to pay pji for all
punishments intended irrespective of whether they are feasible and of whether pun-
ishing sets their own payoffs to zero. Since participants’ earnings can still become
negative if they punish someone else, this restriction does not affect the set of sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria. In imposing this restriction, we follow the literature on
the standard setting (see e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
7 Gächter et al. (2008) have found that the length of the horizon can affect contri-
butions in the standard setting, particularly in treatments with punishment.
8 There was one session that was intended to be 15 periods, but where a computer
crashed in period 11. We added this session as a 10 period session to the data, but
none of the primary ﬁndings are affected if we exclude this session.
2.5. Other details
Participants answered a sequence of questions at the end of the
experiment (see Online Appendix B). We report summary statis-
tics on these characteristics in Tables 14 and 15 in Online Appendix
F, where analysis of the questionnaire data can be found. In all
treatments, the amount that participants received at the end of the
experiment was equal to a €2 show up fee plus the amount of tokens
after the last period converted into Euros. 1 token was equal to 0.05
Euros. All experiments were run at the BEE-Lab at Maastricht Uni-
versity and used z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 8 in Appendix D
shows the exact order of sessions for the main treatments. In total,
656 participants took part in our experiment: 152 in treatment NOP-
UNISH (38 groups), 144 in treatment PUNISH (36 groups) and the
remainder in one of the additional treatments. Table 7 in Appendix D
summarizes the treatment structure and the number of independent
observations, participants and sessions for each treatment. Average
earnings were 11.94 Euros with a minimum of 2 Euros and a max-
imum of 241.65 Euros. No other sessions apart from those reported
here were conducted and there were no pilot studies.
3. Theoretical background and research questions
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the theoretical predictions and
then present our research questions. We focus on the standard solu-
tion concepts for dynamic games with observable actions, i.e., Nash
equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) under the
standard textbook assumptions of self-interest and common knowl-
edge of rationality. First, observe that the games that describe our
treatments are not repeated games, as the set of available actions at
each subgame depends on themoves that have been already realized.
Therefore, unlike in the standard setting, we cannot directly apply
the wide range of well-known results on ﬁnitely repeated games.
Nevertheless, it turns out that SPE leads to very similar predictions
as in the standard setting. On the equilibrium path all players con-
tribute 0 in all periods, and moreover in the punishment treatment
no player ever punishes. The purpose of stating these results is not to
argue that they will be good predictions of behaviour, but rather to
give the reader a sense of the incentive properties of the public good
game with dynamic interdependencies. In this section, we will state
the result informally. Formal statements and proofs can be found in
Online Appendix C.
Proposition 1. Consider the public good game with growth as deﬁned
above. The unique SPE of both the game without punishment and with
punishment is such that all players contribute 0 throughout the entire
game (both on and off the equilibrium path).
As is the case with the standard setting, positive contributions
can be sustained under different assumptions. Particularly reputa-
tional models that invoke the existence of behavioural types such as
e.g. Kreps et al. (1982) have the potential to induce positive contri-
butions in either setting, but also to drive a wedge between the two
settings in terms of the extent of cooperation found. More precisely,
following Kreps et al. (1982), let us assume that there are two types
of agents: (i) “standard” rational and self interested types and (ii)
conditional cooperators who start out by contributing 10 tokens and
then match at each time t the minimal contribution in their group
at t − 1. We assume that all agents are of type (i) and that each
agent has a minimal doubt that other agents may be of type (ii), i.e.
conditional cooperators. More precisely we denote by l the proba-
bility with which agents believe that all other agents are conditional
cooperators. We also denote by T the length of the game, which in
our experiment is either 10 or 15 periods. We can then state the
following result.
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Proposition 2. Assume l < 1035 . All sequential equilibria involve
positive contributions on the outcome path
• if and only if l > lˆS := 5020T+5 in the standard setting and
• if and only if l > lˆG := 6.254 •1.5T−2.25 in our setting.
For any ﬁxed l < 1035 , the equilibrium always involves strictly more
periods of positive contributions in our setting.
The proof of this result can be found in Online Appendix C.
Because of the incentives provided by exponential growth, even a
small doubt that some agents may be conditional cooperators suf-
ﬁces to induce positive contributions on the equilibrium path. In
the standard setting, by contrast, such doubts have to be substan-
tial (l > 0.19) to even get one period of positive contributions. In
fact, if 0.03 < l < 0.19 and T = 10, then positive contributions can
only be sustained in the setting with growth. For any given l, more
periods of contributions will be observed in the setting with growth.
And, across the periods where contributions are positive, the amount
contributed is constant in the standard setting and increasing in the
setting with growth (for a related result in Centipede games, see
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992).
We next summarize our research questions. First and fore-
most, we are interested in whether participants contribute positive
amounts and in how much wealth is created in this game.
Q1 Are there sustained positive contributions in our setting? How
much wealth is created?
Apart from wealth creation, we are also interested in the amount
of inequality created both within and across groups. Of particular
interest is the relation between inequality and growth. The sign of
the relation between inequality and growth of societies as well as
the causal link between the two has been at the center of a debate in
macroeconomics and development (Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Pers-
son and Tabellini, 1991). Hence, while Q1 asks whether societies can
see positive contributions and increasing wealth over time, our next
question Q2 asks how much inequality is generated in this process
and how inequality affects growth. Our setting allows us to address
this question both within and across groups. In particular, we ask
whether “rich” or “poor” groupswill bemore unequal and how initial
inequality affects growth and hence ﬁnal wealth.
Q2 How much inequality is generated in our setting? What are
the consequences of endogenous inequality for growth?
Last, we are interested in the effects of punishment in our setting.
Punishment has been shown to be effective in the standard set-
ting in securing high contributions and wealth (Gächter et al., 2008).
In our setting, however, punishment does destroy resources which
could otherwise be used productively in the following period. Pun-
ishment in the dynamic setting can have additional adverse effects
that operate via endogenously created inequality. Because earnings
are carried over across periods, free-riders in our setting will have
more resources to punish others than contributors. Hence, the possi-
bility of punishment could strengthen existing inequalities because
it makes shirking individuals more powerful. This in turn could
undermine the effectiveness of punishment.
Q3 How does the possibility of punishment affect contributions,
growth and inequality?
4. Results
This section comprises our main results. Section 4.1 focuses on
Question 1, i.e. on how much participants contribute and how much
wealth is generated in this setting. Section 4.2 focuses on Ques-
tion 2, i.e. how much inequality is endogenously created. We study
the effect of punishment (Q3) within each of these subsections. In
Section 5, we discuss additional results and possible mechanisms
behind our results.
4.1. Provision of the public good and wealth creation
We start by discussing contributions. Panel (a) in Fig. 1 shows the
average amount of tokens participants contributed over time. Con-
tributions are clearly non-zero and are increasing over time in all
treatments. Even without punishment participants contribute about
10 tokens in the ﬁrst period and then steadily increase this amount
over time. Contributions ﬂatten out towards the end of the experi-
ment and there is even a statistically signiﬁcant drop in period 15
in the long horizon game. Note that increasing contributions over
time imply that participants have increasing endowments over time.
Hence, increasing contributions do not necessarily imply that partic-
ipants contribute increasing shares of their endowments. Panel (b) in
Fig. 1 shows the share of overall endowments contributed over time
in all main treatments. In NOPUNISH, participants contribute around
55% of their endowment in period 1. This amount steadily decreases
between periods 2 and 8 and is roughly constant afterwards at a
level of about 35% of endowments. In the 15-period games, shares
follow a similar pattern until period 10, then start to decrease again
afterwards.
Panel (a) in Fig. 1 presents a stark contrast to typical 10-period
public good games in the standard setting, where contributions are
decreasing over time (see e.g. Figure 3 in Fehr and Gächter, 2000).9
It should be kept in mind, though, that in the standard setting with
stationary exogenous endowments, the dynamics of contributions
over time is the same irrespective of whether it is measured in abso-
lute terms or as a share of endowment. In Fehr and Gächter (2000),
for example, contributions equal around 50–60% of endowments in
Period 1 and decrease to around 10% of endowments by Period 10.
Panel (b) in Fig. 1 shows that in our setting contributions stabilize
at a higher level (≈35%) in the 10-period games even if measured as
share of endowments contributed. One possible explanation is that
the dynamic incentives with the possibility of exponential growth
have a similar effect to that of increasing MPCR’s in the standard set-
ting (Isaac andWalker, 1988; Goeree et al., 2002).10 This higher level
of shares contributed seems not to be sustainable in the longer run,
though. By period 15, a similar share of endowments is contributed
as in the standard setting after 10 periods (10–20 %).
Possibly of more interest are the implications contributions have
for wealth generation and growth. To measure growth, we deﬁne a
variable “wealth” which sums the endowments of all participants in
a given group at the beginning of the following period, i.e. wealth in
t would be
∑
i∈IN
t+1
i using the notation from Section 3. Before the
start of period 1, wealth will be 80 in all groups by construction. The
9 Decreasing patterns in public good games are found for MPCR’s roughly in the
range of the MPCR of our one shot game of 0.375. For higher MPCR’s (e.g. 0.75) con-
tributions are still decreasing, but more weakly so (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Zelmer,
2003).
10 In a CPR game Herr et al. (1997) observe a pattern of relatively constant extraction
over time. They ﬁnd extraction rates that are close to the prediction of the inte-
rior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In our setting, the SPE is not interior, but
prescribes zero contributions instead, while the contribution levels we ﬁnd experi-
mentally are substantially above that. Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015) study a
dynamic CPR game where for suﬃciently high regrowth rates the resource will be
provided indeﬁnitely in equilibrium.
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(a) Amounts (b) Share of Endowment
Fig. 1. The average amount of tokens contributed over time in treatments NOPUNISH (Without Punishment) and PUNISH (With Punishment) in the 10-period and 15-period
variations. Bars indicate one standard error of the mean.
maximal wealth that can be reached in period 10 (if everyone con-
tributes their entire endowment in each period) is approximately
3075 tokens or €153. After period 15, themaximum is approximately
35000 tokens or €1751. The minimal wealth that can be reached (if
no one ever contributes anything) is 80 in NOPUNISH and negative
in PUNISH (if someone punishes others and is heavily punished in
the same period). Table 1 shows some summary statistics regarding
wealth. Groups do achieve growth on average. While there is clearly
growth, groups do not realize themaximal potential eﬃciency. In the
10-period games, groups reach on average a level of 439.69 tokens
out of 3075 maximally possible or 14.29%. There is large heterogene-
ity with the richest group reaching 1663 tokens and hencemore than
10 times more than the poorest group.
Fig. 2 shows the dynamics of wealth over time. Panel (a) focuses
on all groups, panel (b) on those with above median wealth in
Period 10 (“successful” groups) and panel (c) on those with below
median wealth in Period 10 (“unsuccessful” groups). Average wealth
is increasing across periods (see coeﬃcients b1 and b4 in Tables 9
and 10 in Appendix D) and is substantially above 80 once period 10
is reached (Table 1). Not all groups achieve growth, however. There
are several groups where wealth does not rise (substantially) above
80. Figs. E.1–E.2 in Online Appendix E illustrate wealth (and Gini
coeﬃcients) over time in different matching groups.
Result 1 (Contributions and wealth creation). Amounts con-
tributed are positive and increasing over time even without punish-
ment. Wealth is growing over time, but there is large variation across
Table 1
Summary statistics on variable wealth.
Wealth Ranksum test
NOPUNISH PUNISH Higher ranksum p-Value
t = 10 Mean 439.69 540.30 NOPUNISH 0.0928
t = 10 Median 299 143
t = 10 Std.Dev. 345.39 793.17
t = 10 Max 1663 2724
t = 10 Min 158 0
Observations 23 21
t = 15 Mean 1503.46 713.06 NOPUNISH 0.3720
t = 15 Median 422 248
t = 15 Std.Dev. 2873.79 1279.54
t = 15 Max 8687 5096
t = 15 Min 155 0
Observations 15 15
groups with the richest group earningmore than 10 times more than
the poorest after 10 periods and more than 55 times more after 15
periods.
4.1.1. Effects of punishment on contributions and wealth
We next consider the effect of punishment on contributions and
wealth. Absolute contributions end up higher in PUNISH compared to
NOPUNISH (Panel (a) in Fig. 1), but they start to differ only fromperiod
7 onwards in the 10-period games and in the 15-period games they
are higher only in the very last period. In terms of shares contributed
(Panel (b) of Fig. 1), in PUNISH, contributions are roughly constant
across all periods at a level of about 60%, though there is a slight
decrease towards the end of the 15 period games. This is above the
share at which groups stabilize in treatments without punishment.
However, groups in PUNISH are also poorer. Median wealth is
higher in NOPUNISH compared to PUNISH (Table 1) and the differ-
ence in mean ranks is statistically signiﬁcant in the 10-period games
according to a one-sided ranksum test (p < 0.0001 for all periods;
p = 0.0928 for t = 10 data only). To assess the statistical signif-
icance of differences in means, we run OLS regressions where we
regress wealth on a treatment dummy for PUNISH (Table 2). These
regressions show that differences in means are only signiﬁcant for
belowmedian groups in the 10-period games which earn on average
213 tokens less in PUNISH compared to NOPUNISH. Several of these
groups, in fact, end up with zero income in PUNISH. In the 15-period
games, differences are statistically signiﬁcant across all groups with
mean wealth in period 15 being about 790 tokens lower in PUN-
ISH compared to NOPUNISH. The fact that punishment seems more
harmful the longer the horizon stands in contrast to results obtained
in the standard setting by e.g. Gächter et al. (2008). Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 9 in Appendix D assess differences in time trends using
a linear (column (1)) and square (column (2)) polynomial in period.
While wealth is increasing in both treatments (b1,b1 + b3), the lin-
ear trend in column (1) is no different across treatments (b3). The
square polynomial does reveal differences in time trends, though.
While wealth is initially increasing at a lower rate in PUNISH (b3),
it increases at a faster rate in later period (b5). Fig. 2 illustrates
these results. It shows that wealth is lower in PUNISH compared to
NOPUNISH across all periods except for the last three periods in the
10-period games.
Overall, these results indicate that the threat of punishment is
not needed to sustain high contributions in public good games with
growth and does not increase wealth. Instead, the dynamic evolution
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Fig. 2. Average wealth over time across treatments. Panel (a) all groups, (b) groups with above median wealth and (c) groups with below median wealth. Bars indicate one
standard error of the mean.
of the public good drives contributions and wealth. This is in stark
contrast to what we know from other social dilemma games, where
punishment has been shown to be successful in both raising contri-
butions (in Fehr and Gächter’s (2000) study on the standard setting
by around 600%) as well as wealth in later periods (in Fehr and
Gächter’s (2000) study from period 4 onwards (Result 8 in Fehr and
Gächter, 2000). In Section 5, we discuss in more detail why pun-
ishment is less effective in our setting. There we also analyze data
from an experiment by Herrmann et al. (2008) conducted in the
standard setting and show that in this case punishment leads to
unambiguously higher wealth.
Result 2 (Effect of punishment onwealth creation). The possibility
of punishment does not increase wealth. In the long horizon games
(15 periods), average wealth is even lower in PUNISH compared to
NOPUNISH.
4.2. Inequality
In this subsection, we focus on the amount of inequality created
endogenously in our setting. As measure of inequality we use the
Gini coeﬃcient as deﬁned in Deaton (1997). The smallest possible
value the Gini coeﬃcient takes is zero (if all four group members
own one fourth of the wealth) and the largest possible value it takes
is one (if one group member holds the entire wealth). Table 1 shows
some summary statistics regarding the Gini coeﬃcient. The period
10 Gini coeﬃcient ranges between 0 and 0.43 in NOPUNISH with
a median of 0.22 and assumes the full range between 0 and 1 in
PUNISH with a median of 0.03. The period 15 Gini coeﬃcient ranges
between 0.03 and 0.49 in NOPUNISH and between 0 and 0.67 in
PUNISH.
Fig. 3 illustrates the dynamics of the Gini coeﬃcient over time.
The ﬁgure shows that in NOPUNISH inequality is sharply increas-
ing from the initial value of zero and then increases more slowly
between periods 2 and 10 to reach a level of ≈0.2 in period 10 (b2
and b4 in column (2) of Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix D). Interest-
ingly, these patterns almost perfectly mimic the trends in inequality
identiﬁed in a recent paper by Nishi et al. (2015) (see their Fig. 2)
who study the effect of visibility of wealth (and inequality) in a
cooperation game played on a network. A longer horizon seems to
lead to slower growth in inequality, but by period 15 Gini coeﬃ-
cients are not statistically different from those reached in period 10
of the shorter horizon games. Panel (b) shows groups with above
Table 2
OLS regression of wealth on treatment dummy. Period 10 (15) data only.
Wealth
10 period games 15 period games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Below median Above median All Below median Above median
PUNISH 107.0 −213.0∗∗∗ 361.3 −790.4∗∗ −101.3 −1239
(89.2) (17.68) (280.2) (395.6) (101.3) (1408)
Constant 439.7∗∗∗ 238.3∗∗∗ 659.4∗∗∗ 1503∗∗ 239.7∗∗∗ 2609*
(71.46) (12.51) (117.9) (732.2) (23.86) (1269)
Observations 44 22 22 30 15 15
R-squared 0.008 0.873 0.074 0.033 0.061 0.049
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
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Fig. 3. Average Gini coeﬃcient over time across treatments. Panel (a) all groups, (b) groups with above median wealth and (c) groups with below median wealth. Bars indicate
one standard error of the mean.
median wealth, which display lower levels of inequality than those
with below median wealth illustrated in Panel (c) (ranksum test
p < 0.001 all periods, p = 0.1096 period 10, p > 0.1 period 15).
Result 3 (Inequality). Mean Gini coeﬃcients are increasing over
time reaching ≈0.2 in the last period. There is substantial varia-
tion in Gini coeﬃcients across groups, particularly in PUNISH where
the Gini assumes the full range between 0 and 1 in the 10-period
games.
4.2.1. Effects of punishment on inequality
We next study the effect of punishment on inequality. Mean
Gini coeﬃcients are similar across treatments and there are no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant differences in mean Gini coeﬃcients between
NOPUNISH and PUNISH in period 10 or 15, respectively (see Table 4).
By contrast, analysis conducted with data from a standard public
good game in Section 5.4 shows that in this setting punishment leads
to more inequality. In fact, in our case the median Gini coeﬃcient
tends to be even higher in NOPUNISH compared to PUNISH (Table 3).
The difference in mean ranks is statistically signiﬁcant (one-sided
ranksum test p = 0.0395) only in the 10-period games. There is also
Table 3
Summary statistics on the variable Gini coeﬃcient. Period 10 (15) data only.
Gini coeﬃcient Ranksum test
NOPUNISH PUNISH Higher ranksum p-Value
t = 10 Mean 0.21 0.22 NOPUNISH 0.0395
t = 10 Median 0.22 0.03
t = 10 Std.Dev. 0.12 0.35
t = 10 Max 0.43 1
t = 10 Min 0.00 0
Observations 23 21
t = 15 Mean 0.18 0.14 NOPUNISH 0.1508
t = 15 Median 0.10 0.05
t = 15 Std.Dev. 0.16 0.20
t = 15 Max 0.49 0.67
t = 15 Min 0.03 0
Observations 15 15
more variation in PUNISH (one-sided variance ratio test on period 10
data only, p < 0.0001; period 15 data: p < 0.0001) where the Gini
coeﬃcient assumes the full range between 0 and 1 in the 10-period
games and between 0 and 0.67 in the 15-period games.
Fig. 3 illustrates these results as well as differences in time trends.
Across all groups (Panel (a)) the dynamics of inequality seem sim-
ilar across treatments with somewhat more volatility in PUNISH.
Columns (1)–(2) of Table 11 in Appendix D show that there are few
statistically signiﬁcant differences in these time trends. The dynam-
ics of inequality over time seem also quite similar in above median
groups, where the difference is mostly one of means (Panel (b)).
In below median groups, however, time trends are quite different
across treatments (Panel (c)). In NOPUNISH, inequality is steadily
increasing over time at a slow rate, while in PUNISH, the Gini coef-
ﬁcient seems to follow a different pattern. After increasing initially,
it decreases sharply around periods 4–7 and then starts to increase
again. One possible interpretation is that this pattern reﬂects cycles
of reciprocal punishment. Depending on who punishes (shirkers or
high contributors) inequality increases or decreases. We discuss dif-
ferences in punishment behaviour between below and abovemedian
groups in more detail in Section 5.3.
Result 4 (Effect of punishment on inequality). Mean inequality
(Gini) is not statistically different in PUNISH compared to NOPUNISH
in period 10 (15). There is more across-group variation in inequality
in PUNISH.
5. Discussion and additional results
In this section, we discuss some of the potential mechanisms
underlying ourmain results. Section 5.1 discusses results on the rela-
tionship between growth and inequality. In Section 5.2, we will try
to tease apart the effect of exponential growth opportunities from
the effect of endogenously created inequality. In Section 5.3, we pro-
vide some additional results on punishment, which should help us
get a deeper understanding of why punishment is less effective here
than in the standard setting. Finally, in Section 5.4, we use data from
experiments conducted by Herrmann et al. (2008) to study wealth
and inequality in the standard setting.
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Table 4
OLS regression of Gini coeﬃcient on treatment dummy. Period 10 data only.
Gini coeﬃcient
10 period games 15 period games
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Below median Above median All Below median Above median
PUNISH −0.020 0.008 −0.040 −0.041 −0.013 −0.068
(0.035) (0.128) (0.062) (0.033) (0.110) (0.072)
Constant 0.220∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.038) (0.029) (0.023) (0.053) (0.064)
Observations 44 22 22 30 15 15
R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.013 0.001 0.055
Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
5.1. The relation between growth and inequality
We study the relationship between growth and inequality across
and within groups starting with across-group inequality. In NOP-
UNISH, the two variables are essentially uncorrelated. The Spear-
man correlation coeﬃcient is −0.1840 in above median groups and
−0.0630 in belowmedian groups, neither of which is statistically dif-
ferent from zero. In PUNISH, by contrast, there is a substantial and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between these two variables. In
above median groups the correlation is negative (Spearman corre-
lation coeﬃcient q = −0.6091∗∗): higher wealth comes with lower
inequality. In fact, most groups that achieve very high levels of
wealth in period 10, have a Gini coeﬃcient of almost zero. For below
median groups, the correlation is positive (q = 0.4683∗): higher
wealth comes with higher inequality. As a consequence inequality
is highest in groups with intermediate levels of wealth in PUNISH.
Fig. D.1 in Appendix D illustrates the correlation between period 10
wealth and Gini coeﬃcients for both treatments. The same patterns
hold in the 15-period games, but, possibly due to lower power, there
is no statistical signiﬁcance.
These differences between above and below median groups
appear already as early as in the second period of the game. For
NOPUNISH, both successful (above median wealth in period 10) and
unsuccessful (below median wealth in period 10) groups have a
Gini coeﬃcient of 0.13 on average in period 2. In the 15-period
games, these numbers are 0.13 and 0.14, respectively. In PUNISH,
on the other hand, there are substantial differences. Groups that are
eventually successful have a Gini coeﬃcient of about 0.11 in period
2 (0.10 in the 15-period games), while unsuccessful groups have a
Gini coeﬃcient of 0.27 (0.25 in 15-period games), more than twice as
high. Hence, successful and unsuccessful groups already differ after
the ﬁrst round of the public good game.
This observation motivates us to study the extent of path depen-
dency within groups. Table 5 presents evidence in this respect. It
shows the correlation between wealth in period 10 (period 15) and
the wealth or the Gini coeﬃcient in previous periods. Path depen-
dence is evident. Early period wealth is strongly correlated with late
periodwealth. The Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between periods
2 and 10 income is 0.48∗∗∗ in NOPUNISH and even 0.82∗∗∗ in PUNISH.
Maybemore interestingly, also early period inequality is highly detri-
mental to ﬁnal wealth, but only in PUNISH. The correlation between
inequality in period 2 and wealth in period 10 is −0.47∗∗∗, which
is substantial. In NOPUNISH, by contrast, early period inequality (in
periods 2–4) is not negatively correlated with wealth. In this treat-
ment the negative correlation appears only from period 5 onwards.
The fact that there is no negative correlation between periods 7, 8,
and 9 inequalities and period 10 wealth in PUNISH is due to the fact
that by then, several groups have zero wealth and inequality. Drop-
ping these groups restores the negative correlation. Comparing 15
period wealth and early period inequality (bottom panel of Table 5)
shows similar patterns.
One question about these ﬁndings is whether they just reﬂect a
stable distribution of “contribution types” or whether there is some-
thing more fundamental to it in the sense that the same people are
more likely to end up with a much lower wealth if initial inequality
is high. The fact that the negative correlation between early period
Table 5
Correlation of wealth in period 10 with wealth (Gini) in periods 2,. . . ,9. Bottom panel: correlation of wealth in period 15 with Gini in periods 11–14 and 2–5, respectively.
Wealth in period . . .
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
NOPUNISH 0.99∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
PUNISH 0.99∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
Gini coeﬃcient in period . . .
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
NOPUNISH −0.29∗∗∗ −0.16∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.03 0.03 0.11
PUNISH 0.03 0.11 −0.06 −0.43∗∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗
Gini coeﬃcient in period . . . (15 period games)
14 13 12 11 . . . 5 4 3 2
NOPUNISH −0.12 −0.13 −0.12 −0.16 −0.19 0.07 −0.02 0.18
PUNISH 0.31∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗
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inequality and wealth is only observed in PUNISH, suggests that this
is not just a mechanical effect of having different distributions of
“contribution types” across groups.
Additional support for this view can be derived from our post-
experimental questionnaire. Table 16 in Online Appendix F shows
the average amount in Euros that participants decide to donate to
Medics without Borders at the end of the experiment. We ﬁnd that
participants from above median groups do not contribute more on
average than those from groups with below median wealth. This is
despite the fact that participants from groups with above median
wealth earn 178 tokens on average in period 10 (189 in treatment
PUNISH), while those from groups with below median wealth earn
only 56 tokens (23 tokens) on average in period 10. This suggests that
participants in groups with abovemedian wealth are not per se more
altruistic than others. We also elicited 14 other personality charac-
teristics as well as a measure of risk aversion in the questionnaire.
Tables 17–18 in Online Appendix F show that none of them is able to
explain the variation in wealth or inequality that we observe.
Result 5 (Relation between growth and inequality). 1. In PUNISH,
wealth and Gini coeﬃcient are positively correlated for poor groups
(below median wealth) and negatively correlated for rich groups
(above median wealth) in the 10-period games. These correlations
are weak and not statistically different from zero in NOPUNISH.
2. (a) Early period wealth is positively correlated with eventual
wealth in all treatments. (b) Early period inequality is negatively
correlated with ﬁnal wealth only in PUNISH.
Taken together, both the ﬁndings on across- as well as within-
group correlation point to a detrimental role of inequality if there
are punishment possibilities. One of the reasons, hence, why pun-
ishment is not as effective in this setting seems to be that people
react strongly to inequality. The ﬁndings are also indicative as to why
we observe such substantial variation across groups both in terms
of wealth and inequality. Groups in which initial behaviour leads
to high inequality seem to get locked into a path of punishment
and counter-punishment (interpreted as experimental equivalents
of conﬂict) that eventually leads to a destruction of all wealth. We
will see more evidence of such behaviour in Section 5.3. In fact, there
is a strand of literature, where economic historians point out the
importance of institutional lock in with institutions broadly under-
stood as both formal constraints, such as rules and laws and informal
constraints, such as norms of behaviour, conventions and codes of
conduct (North, 1994). Our study provides an example of how a
society (group) can get locked into dysfunctional behavioural norms.
Before we conclude this section, let us point to potential links
to other literatures. The sign of the relation between inequality and
growth as well as the causal link between the two has been at the
center of a debate in macroeconomics and development (see e.g.
Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 1991, among many
others). Most of these authors ﬁnd either a negative relation or no
signiﬁcant relation at all. In our context, the relation depends on
the wealth of the group. For very poor groups in our data, inequal-
ity and wealth are positively related, while they are negatively
related for richer groups. This is reminiscent of the famous Kuznets
curve (Kuznets, 1955) which claims an inverse U-shaped relation-
ship between growth and inequality. The connection between our
setting and the fate of countries is too loose to draw any conclusions.
Our results suggest, however, that there may be interesting links,
between the level of social capital (cooperation, trust), the level of
inequality and the level of growth of societies.11
11 Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) have already identiﬁed a rela-
tionship between trust and growth across different countries. Our setting and results
point to a potential mechanism behind this relationship.
5.2. Eliminating inequality and growth possibilities
In this subsection, we further tease apart the importance of
endogenous inequality and growth by studying treatments were
we shut down one of these channels exogenously. In treatments
NOPUNISH-NOGROWTH and PUNISH-NOGROWTH, we artiﬁcially
eliminate growth by re-normalizing all endowments at the begin-
ning of a period s.t. they sum to 80. More precisely, while in
treatment NOPUNISH, the following relation holds for endowments
Nt+1i = N
t
i − ati + 1.54
∑
j=1,...,4a
t
j , we now re-normalize
Nt+1i =
80 ∗
(
Nti − ati + 1.54
∑
j=1,...,4
atj
)
∑
j=1,...,4
(
Ntj − atj + 1.54
∑
j=1,...,4
atj
) .
This means that each participant’s endowment ranges between
0 and 80 in each round and the sum of endowments in a group
equals 80 in each period. This 10 period game hence, can be viewed
as a public good game played in period 10, where the endowment
each participant has is determined by the game played in periods
1–9. The unique SPNE is zero contributions in each period as in
our main treatments. Note that this structure, while derived from
our treatment NOPUNISH via a single change creates a situation
where everyone contributing no longer Pareto dominates nobody
contributing in periods 1–9. Consequently, participants may have
different motives for contributing in these treatments compared to
our main treatments and the results should be interpreted with this
in mind.We do the analogous normalization for the punishment ver-
sion (PUNISH-NOGROWTH). We had 116 participants (29 groups) in
treatment NOPUNISH-NOGROWTH and 92 participants (23 groups)
in treatment PUNISH-NOGROWTH.
Table 13 (column (1)) in Appendix D shows the results of regres-
sion where we regress normalized contributions on treatment dum-
mies. The baseline is NOPUNISH. To ensure a fair comparison, we
also normalize contributions in NOPUNISH and PUNISH. Normalized
contributions in these treatments are computed by multiplying the
share of actual endowment contributed with normalized endow-
ments. Maybe unsurprisingly, given the absence of even social incen-
tives to contribute across periods 1–9 of the games without growth,
contributions are substantially lower and close to zero.
In treatments NOPUNISH-NOINEQUALITY and PUNISH-
NOINEQUALITY, we artiﬁcially eliminate inequality. In these
treatments, we redistribute all earnings at the beginning of each
period, s.t. endowments are equal for all players. Hence, each player
receives
Nt+1i =
∑
i=1,...,4
(
Nti − ati + 1.54
∑
j=1,...,4
atj
)
4
at the beginning of period t+ 1. To reduce incentives to contribute,
we implemented an additional change in this treatment. In particu-
lar, we paid a randomly drawn period rather than the last period.12
Of course, paying a randomly selected period could affect behaviour
12 Paying the last period in this treatment (as we did in the other treatments) would
mean that there are incentives to contribute across all periods, making this setting dif-
ﬁcult to compare to our other treatments. Paying a randomly selected period reduces
this incentive. In particular, with a randomly paid period there are no incentives to
contribute in the last period. In the 9-th period there is a tradeoff between increasing
the endowment available in period 10 by contributing and increasing the 9th period
payoff by not contributing. This tradeoff is resolved towards not contributing for peri-
ods 9, 8, 7 and 6. In earlier periods, however, there are incentives to contribute in order
to increase the endowment available in future rounds.
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Fig. 4. Average amount of tokens used to punish over time by groups with above
median wealth (dashed line) and groups with below median wealth (solid line).
per se, a possibility we cannot rule out. To this extent, the results
from this treatment should be read as suggestive and as comple-
menting the evidence from Sections 5.1 and 5.3 rather than yielding
deﬁnite conclusions on the role of inequality. We had 96 participants
(24 groups) in NOPUNISH-NOINEQUALITY and 56 participants (14
groups) in PUNISH-NOINEQUALITY.
The second column in Table 13 (Appendix D) shows that inequal-
ity leads to lower contributions in both the treatments with and
without punishment. Eliminating inequality increases mean contri-
butions by 26 tokens without punishment and by 42 tokens with
punishment. Furthermore, if inequality is eliminated then mean
contributions are ≈24 tokens higher with punishment (PUNISH-
NOINEQUALITY) than without (NOPUNISH-NOINEQUALITY), a dif-
ference that is statistically signiﬁcant (w2 < 0.001). It seems that
endogenous inequality in endowments with the associated inequal-
ity in the power to punish undermines the effectiveness of punish-
ment. Since we exogenously remove inequality in the treatments
discussed here, the results from this section support a causal inter-
pretation of the effect of inequality on wealth.
5.3. Anatomy of punishment
Both Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have pointed to a negative role of
inequality for contributions and wealth particularly in treatment
PUNISH. To understand why this is the case it is helpful to study
punishment patterns more closely.
We ﬁrst compare above and below median groups in treatment
PUNISH to understand which patterns of punishment lead to low
wealth in this treatment and are hence crucial for the ineffectiveness
of punishment in this setting. Fig. 4 reveals an interesting pattern
in this regard. It shows the amounts of tokens participants use to
punish over time. In groups with above median wealth, the abso-
lute amounts used to punish tend to remain stable or increase over
time (OLS coeﬃcient: 1.402∗ (10 periods); 0.098 (15 periods)),13
while they tend to decrease in belowmedian groups (OLS coeﬃcient:
−0.830∗∗∗ (10 periods); −0.332∗∗∗ (15 periods)). Particularly striking
is the fact that, in terms of amounts, the major difference between
above and belowmedian groups seems to lie in howmuch they pun-
ish in the ﬁrst two periods of the game (two-sided ranksum test
p < 0.0001). In successful groups, there is also an interesting peak
13 We regress total amount spent on (intended) punishment on a constant and a
variable period ranging from 1,. . . ,10 (15, respectively).
Table 6
Mean (SD) of amount of tokens of pro-social and anti-social punishment.
Pro-social punishment Anti-social punishment
10 period games
All 1.91 (18.73) 0.65 (4.07)
Gini> 0.04 1.14 (3.24) 1.52 (12.03)
Gini< 0.04 2.68 (26.22) 0.45 (2.10)
Wealth> 80 3.10 (26.84) 0.62 (5.25)
Wealth< 80 0.44 (1.58) 0.46 (1.87)
15 period games
All 1.24 (5.01) 0.65 (2.83)
Gini> 0.08 1.25 (4.23) 0.84 (3.55)
Gini< 0.08 1.23 (5.55) 0.50 (2.09)
Wealth> 158 2.25 (8.26) 0.62 (3.84)
Wealth< 158 0.77 (2.14) 0.66 (2.22)
in punishment one period before the game ends. This suggests that
some participants may tolerate some degrees of free-riding while
they wait to punish others harshly at the end of the game. This seems
intuitive because of the detrimental effect that punishment can have
on growth. While in below median groups, most punishment hap-
pens in the beginning of the game, above median groups punish at
the end.14
We next ask under which conditions punishment is “pro-social”
and when it is “anti-social”. Herrmann et al. (2008) have found that
anti-social punishment strongly undermines successful cooperation
in the standard setting, whereas pro-social punishment fosters coop-
eration. Punishment by player i is pro-social if i punishes a player
who has contributed a lower share of his endowment to the public
good than i herself. Punishment by player i is anti-social if i punishes
a player who has contributed a higher share of his endowment to the
public good than i herself.
Table 6 shows that there ismore pro-social punishment than anti-
social punishment (one-sided ranksum test, p < 0.0001). Anti-social
punishment is higher if inequality is high (pro-social: Spearman q =
0.0155 (q = 0.1231∗∗∗, 15 period games); anti-social: q = 0.0777∗∗
(q = 0.1515∗∗∗, 15 period games)). Anti-social punishment is not sig-
niﬁcantly related to wealth (q = −0.0109; q = 0.1184 in 15 period
games), but there is more pro-social punishment in high-wealth
compared to low-wealth groups (q = 0.1371∗∗∗; q = 0.2302∗∗∗ in
15 period games).
5.4. Wealth and inequality in the standard setting
Before we conclude, we have a brief look at data from the stan-
dard setting. We focus on wealth and inequality, as those are not
commonly reported measures in the standard setting. In particular,
we use data from experiments that Herrmann et al. (2008) conducted
in Bonn. Bonn andMaastricht are at only 120 kmdriving distance and
a large share of students at both Universities comes from the lower
middle Rhine and upper lower Rhine area (between Koblenz and
Duesseldorf) in Germany. This should make subject pools approx-
imately comparable. Just as us, Herrmann et al. (2008) conducted
10 period games with an endowment of 20 tokens (in their case
exogenously given each period). They also conducted NOPUNISH
and PUNISH treatments with the 3:1 technology that we employ.
The return on contributing in the one-shot game was 0.375 in our
experiments and at 0.4 slightly higher in Herrmann et al. (2008).
Fig. 5 shows wealth and inequality (Gini coeﬃcient) over time in
Herrmann et al. ’s ( 2008 ) experiments. We computed wealth by
adding income of all group members in each period and subtracting
14 Relatedly, Fudenberg and Pathak (2010) have shown that punishment can sustain
cooperation even if it is only observed at the end of a session.
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Fig. 5. Wealth and inequality in data from Herrmann et al. ’s ( 2008 ) Bonn experiments. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.
80 in each period 2,. . . ,10. If all group members contribute zero in
each period (and do not punish) wealth thus computed is 80 in each
period, just as in our setting. If all group members contribute their
full endowment in each period (and do not punish) maximal wealth
in period 10 is 3075 in our setting and 1280 in Herrmann et al.
(2008). Fig. 5 shows that bothwealth and inequality are substantially
higher under the punishment condition in Herrmann et al. ’s ( 2008
) experiments (t-test period 10 sample means: p < 0.01). The effect
of punishment, hence, differs from what we observe in the dynamic
setting, where punishment, if at all, decreases wealth and inequality.
Note also, that we do not observe the cyclical pattern in inequality
identiﬁed in the PUNISH treatments in our setting.
In summary, Section 5.1 demonstrates a negative correlation
between early period inequality and wealth in period 10 in treat-
ment PUNISH. The negative impact of inequality on contributions
and wealth is conﬁrmed with some caveats in Section 5.2 where
we ﬁnd that artiﬁcially removing inequality increases contributions
and wealth both with and without punishment, but with a particu-
larly strong effect in the punishment treatments. Section 5.3 provides
some insights into why inequality is so detrimental in the punish-
ment condition. There are two main effects: (i) in groups where
inequality is high (above median) there is more anti-social than
pro-social punishment, implying that shirkers punish contributors
more than vice versa and (ii) much of this punishment happens
in early periods in unsuccessful groups implying that resources are
taken away exponentially. All these channels contribute to the neg-
ative impact of punishment possibilities on wealth creation in the
dynamic setting. The absence of inequality in endowments in the
standard setting seems to make wealth inequality less salient. This
can potentially explain why punishment does not trigger the adverse
affects identiﬁed in the dynamic setting in the standard setting
(Section 5.4).
6. Conclusions
We studied public good games with dynamic interdependencies,
where each agent’s wealth at the end of a period serves as her
endowment in the following period. We found that contributions
are increasing over time even in the absence of punishment pos-
sibilities. The possibility of punishment does not increase wealth.
These results suggest that in settings with a strong dynamic compo-
nent societies achieve cooperation via the incentives provided by the
dynamic evolution of the public good and not so much via the threat
of punishment. Across groups, inequality in early periods is strongly
negatively correlated with wealth in later periods.
These results show that people are able to establish persistent
cooperation in a setting that shares one key feature with many real-
life interactions: past behaviour matters for future endowments.
They also point to the limits of punishment in securing high contri-
butions and wealth.
The results highlight the importance of incorporating the
dynamic aspects, present in many real-life interactions, explicitly in
experimental designs. In this paper we have done so within the con-
text of cooperation and public good provision.We should emphasize,
though, that we view this design as complementary to the standard
design where contributions occur from stationary exogenous bud-
gets. Both settings have natural applications outside the lab. Public
goods are often created by providing effort, as e.g. in the case of vol-
unteering. In these cases, clearly, endowments cannot easily increase
over time. In many other settings, such as those discussed in the
Introduction 1, provision of public goods creates wealth from which
future public goods can be provided. The evolution of societies might
be viewed through this lens. We have seen that the two settings can
yield quite different conclusions. In the standard settingwith station-
ary budgets and full consumption, punishment has shown to be very
effective at raising contributions and wealth (in the medium run). In
the dynamic setting studied here, the effectiveness of punishment
seems much more limited. It is not successful in raising wealth in
the 10-period games and is even detrimental to wealth in the games
with longer horizon.
Future research should aim at getting a deeper understanding of
the mechanisms behind these differences and adapt this setting to
other contexts where dynamic interdependencies are likely to play
an important role. Studying intermediate settings, with some but not
full consumption and only partially endogenous endowments should
also be of interest for future research.
Appendix A. Supplementary materials
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.03.002.
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